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SUPREME COURT
NASSAU COUNTY
In the Matter of Joseph A. Diurno'
(decided September 2, 1999)
The present matter involves a grant to a guardian of the power to
consent to or refuse routine or major medical treatment to an
individual found incompetent, pursuant to §81.22 [a] [8] of the
Mental Hygiene Law ["MHL"].
The issue in the instant case is the constitutionality of Article 81
of the MiHL with respect to the Rivers due process requirement.4
The Court analyzed the issue in light of a recent New York
Supreme Court decision,5 which called into question the
' 696 N.Y.S.2d 769 (Nassau County Ct. 1999).
2 Id. MENTAL HYG. LAW §81.22 [a] [8] provides:
Consistent with the functional limitations of the incapacitated
person, that person's understanding and appreciation of the
harm that he or she is likely to suffer as the result of the
inability to provide for personal needs, and that person's
personal wishes, preferences, and desires with regard to
managing the activities of daily living, and the least
restrictive form of intervention, the court may grant to the
guardian powers ecessary and sufficient to provide for the
personal needs of the incapacitated person.
Those powers which may be granted include, but are not
limited to, the power to:
8. Consent to or refuse generally accepted routine or major
medical or dental treatment; the guardian shall make
treatment decisions consistent with the findings under section
81.15 of this article and in accordance with the patients
wishes, including the patient's religious and moral beliefs...in
accordance with the person's best interests...and such other
concerns and values as a reasonable person in the
incapacitated person's circumstances would wish to consider.
Id.
3 Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 495 N.E. 337.
4 Diunmo, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 771. See also infra notes 16-18 and accompanying
text.
' In the Matter of New York Presbyterian Hospital, 693 N.Y.S.2d 405 (Sup.
Ct. Westchester County 1999). The Supreme Court of Westchester County
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constitutionality and effectiveness of the Court's grant of such a
power under the MHL.6 The Court concluded that it is not
unconstitutional to grant such a power to the guardian under the
Mental Hygiene Law. Article 81, providing for the approval and
use of this power, is presumed to satisfy the due process
requirements of the Constitution and as a result, medical facilities
and health care providers may administer drugs based on a
guardian's consent without the need for judicial intervention.
Mr. Saverio Conticchio is a diagnosed schizophrenic, who also
suffers from dementia as a result of a head injury sustained in a
1995 car accident in Florida A Florida court committed him
involuntarily to a hospital due to his mental illness on February 27,
1996, and his mother was appointed, by the court, as his guardian.9
In April of 1997, Mr. Conticchio and his mother moved to Nassau
County and the present proceeding for guardianship in New York
was brought.' Because Mr. Conticchio was prescribed medication
for his condition in 1995 and the Supreme Court of Nassau County
determined him to be incapacitated as a result of that condition,"
the court granted guardianship to Joseph Diurno, over the person
and property of Saverio Conticchio. 12 Mr. Diurno was granted the
power to consent to or deny medical treatment on Mr. Conticchio's
behalf.13 The court took the position that a proper guardian's
consent is adequate to allow the "administration of medication to a
nonconsenting incapacitated person without the need for additional
questioned the constitutionality of the Supreme Court of Nassau County's
decision to grant the power to make decisions regarding medical treatment to
the guardian under MHL art. 81. Id. at 410
6 Diurno, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 770.
7 Id. at 776. To the contrary, New York Presbyterian held that due process
considerations are not fulfilled at an Article 81 hearing. New York
Presbyterian, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 409.





'" Id. See MHL §81.03[i] (1999) (providing that "major medical or dental
treatment" includes the administration of psychotropic medication).
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court proceedings or review." 4 The court supported its findings
with the Florida court's involuntary commitment of Mr.
Conticchio and the evidence presented.' 5
The court centered its constitutional discussion around Rivers v.
Katz, a New York Court of Appeals decision.' 6 Rivers held that a
mental patient, who is involuntarily committed, has a constitutional
right to refuse treatment under the due process clause of the New
York State constitution. 17 The Court of Appeals also held that in
circumstances in which the police power of the state is not
involved, and the patient declines to consent to accept
antipsychotic medication, a judicial determination is required."
The purpose of this judicial hearing is to decide whether the patient
has the necessary capacity to form a reasoned decision regarding
the treatment prior to administration of the drugs pursuant to the
state's parens patriae power.'9 After the completion of the
administrative review process, the judicial hearing should be held
de novo, and the patient has the right to be represented by
counsel.2' It is the state's burden to demonstrate, by the standard
of clear and convincing evidence, that the patient is incapable of
making decisions regarding treatment.2
Other courts have disregarded the guardian's consent to
medication under MIL Article 81.' In this case, the Supreme
14 Diurno at 770.
15Id.
16 Id. at 771-776. In Rivers, appellants were patients in a psychiatric center,
each being involuntarily retained. Appellants brought a declaratory judgement
action to enjoin the forceful administration of antipsychotic medication without
consent. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 490-491, 495 N.E.2d 337, 339-340, 504
N.Y.S.2d 76-77.
17 Rivers., at 492, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74. See N.Y. CoNsT.




' See, e.g., New York Presbyterian, 693 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1999) in which the
Court ignored the MHL provision that a legal guardian is judicially authorized
to give consent for administration of medical treatment and ordered a Rivers
hearing as if there were no guardian and no consent given by him.
2000
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Court, Nassau Countuy sought to distinguish and reconcile the
apparent Rivers due process requirement with Article 81 of the
MHL. The court notes that in Rivers the Court of Appeals outlined
procedures to follow in circumstances where an involuntarily
committed patient refuses to consent to antipsychotic medication.'
Rivers did not hold that these procedures are required in different
circumstances.24 The Rivers Court specified that the decision
regarding incapacity was a judicial determination, not a medical
one.' However, the Legislature has since concluded that the
decision regarding capacity could first be determined by a
committee, subject to judicial review under the standard of
substantial evidence.26
Further distinguishing the present case from Rivers, is the fact
that it did not involve a circumstance where there is a statutorily
authorized substitute present to make the decision. 7 The Court in
Rivers had to choose between itself and the doctors of the state as
to who should make the decision regarding the proposed
treatment.' In this aspect, the Court of Appeal's disapproval of
the then existing administrative review process and the lack of
standards for the doctors to follow in making the decisions on
treatment is notable. 9 In a case in which a guardian has been
chosen pursuant to Article 81, a court has already made the
necessary determination of capacity in compliance with due
process requirments. In addition, specified standards as to the
determination of the treatment protocol are in place, which are to
govern a judicially appointed guardian who is more informed with
respect to the incapacitated patient than the court.3" In light of
21 Id. at 774.
24 Id.
2 id.
261 d. See MHL § 80.03[b] (providing that "functional level" means being able
to provide to the personal needs or with respect to property management);
§80.09 (providing for the appointment of a court evaluator for appointment of
a guardian for personal needs or property management).
27 Diurno, 696 N.Y.S.2d 769, 774.
28 id.
29 Id.
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these important factual differences, the Diurno Court holds that
the decision in Rivers, which arguably directs a court to make
another determination, is not a conclusion that MHL §81.22(a)(8)
is
unconstitutional. 2 The Legislature has implied that it does not
give credence to the idea that Rivers formulated a constitutional
requirement that only a court may make treatment protocol
decisions.33
When Rivers was decided, legislation existed which "expressly
provided that a patient's right to refuse medication and treatment,
inter alia, 'shall' be exercised by the patient's committee or
conservator where there is one." Guardians are subject to this
provision as well, and the provision does enunciate the State's
public policy.35 This statute supports the Court's reading of MHL
Article 81 and the conclusion that Rivers does not apply when a
properly appointed guardian is present, at the very least, as far as
treatment protocol decisions are concerned.36 The Diurno Court
concluded that a guardian appointed in accordance with the
standards of due process, appropriately informed of the medical
conditions, with exceptional familiarity with the patient and
performing fiduciary obligations required by mandatory standards
is as qualified, if not more so, than the Court to make medical
decisions.37
I Id. (viewing the provision under the presumption of constitutionality). See
Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 497-498, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 495 N.E. 337.
33 Diurno at 775 (explaining that the Legislature's reenactment of Article 80
and enactment of Article 81 evidenced its intent).
3Id. See Public Health Law § 2803-c[3][e], [].
35 Diurno at 775.
36 Id.
37 Id. (concluding that Rivers does not require the court to find a guardian's
power under MHL §81.22(a)(8) to consent to medical treatment over the
objections of an incapacitated patient is unconstitutional).
2000
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The Court held that the Legislature's intent was appropriately
provided in Article 81 of the MHL, which allows judicially
authorized guardians to make decisions regarding the
administration of antipsychotic drugs to incapacitated individuals.3"
The provisions of Article 81, which authorize the
guardian to use this ability, meet required due process standards
and as a result, medical institutions and providers may administer
drugs based on a guardian's consent with no need for further
judicial action.39
Kimberly Lumpee
38 Diurno at 776.
31 Id. (providing to the extent tfiat Presbyterian Hospital or other cases may
be read differently, they are inconsistent with the provisions and legislative
intent of MHL Article 81.)
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